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Abstract
Psychiatric genetics has a difficult relationship with the public given its unshakeable 
connection to eugenics. Drawing from a five-year public engagement programme that 
emerged from an internationally renowned psychiatric genetics centre, we propose the 
concept of the Buffer Zone to consider how an exchange of viewpoints between groups of 
people – including psychiatric geneticists and lay publics - who are often uneasy in one 
another’s company can be facilitated through the use of art and metaphor. The artwork at the 
exhibitions provided the necessary socio-cultural context for scientific endeavours, whilst 
also enabled public groups to be part of, and remain in, the conversation. Crucial to stress is 
that this mitigation was not to protect the science; it was to protect the discussion. 
Introduction 
‘Scientific communication’ is often conceptualised as scientists conveying scientific 
information to various publics or lay groups (Gregory and Miller 1998; Rowe and Frewer 
2005; Holliman et al. 2009; Davies and Horst 2017). This is notoriously a difficult task to 
accomplish well (Bennett and Jennings 2011). Scientific specialisms consist of esoteric 
knowledge and vernaculars that are at some remove from everyday life and talk. When the 
science in question is psychiatric genetics, though, there are added ‘communication’ barriers 
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to overcome such as the field’s problematic socio and political history (Lewis and Bartlett 
2015). Compared to other branches of genetics, for example, the specialism is much 
maligned; it has had to contend with past failures, false promises (Joseph 2006) and, 
historically, has a difficult relationship with the public given its unshakeable connection to 
eugenics (Kerr and Shakespeare 2002). This backdrop is said to continue to hang over the 
field like Damocles’ sword (Propping 2005), despite today’s promising laboratory 
developments (Stoltenberg and Burmeister 2000; Burmeister et al. 2008). 
Psychiatric genetics’ public groups, including those with direct experience of mental health 
conditions, are multifaceted. Differences include their socio-demographics, their relationship 
to and experience of the psychiatric profession, and the way in which they receive, and offer 
in return, information about conditions that are contested, stigmatised, and potentially 
distressing. The reception of scientific information and their responses can therefore be 
unpredictable and divergent, which means that forms of communication and those who 
communicate them need to be creative and flexible. Science communication as a form of 
public engagement is not a passive, static activity. It is a dynamic, ever-changing and 
ongoing process (Lewis et al. 2017). In this chapter, we use our public engagement arts 
initiative that ran from 2011 to 2015 as a case study to reflect on the ways in which scientific 
information about the genetic contribution of psychiatric conditions is relayed by scientists to 
various non-scientific groups. Linked to an internationally renowned laboratory researching 
the biological underpinnings of psychiatric conditions, which we call The Centre, our 
programme of events engaged a general, non-scientific public, people diagnosed with a 
mental illness, people with a particular interest in mental health, medical students, 
schoolchildren and representatives from within artistic disciplines and communities.  
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Although art and science initiatives like ours have become more commonplace, psychiatric 
genetics may resist an alignment with the arts for fear of being perceived as less scientific by 
its peer disciplines. Also problematic is the desire by scientists to communicate scientific 
facts and to provide unambiguous and objective answers. This can be seen as going against 
the grain of an artistic approach more concerned with provoking questions and evoking 
multiple subjective interpretations and reactions (Costache 2012).  
It has also been put that “artworks inspire, illustrate and communicate knowledge, but they do 
not produce it” (Garneau 2008, p. 27). However, the arts can facilitate the production of 
knowledge through their strong connections with the discursive groups and communities that 
surround, make sense of, and apply science. Furthermore, the arts can encourage a 
questioning approach, exploring the ethical ramifications of developments in knowledge, as 
well as providing a social commentary on scientific practices. In this respect, engagement 
through the arts can provide the necessary socio-cultural context for scientific endeavours, 
whilst also enabling public groups to be part of, and remain in, the conversation. We
therefore reflect on the value of art as a method of participatory engagement with science, 
especially when the science is controversial and highly emotive, like psychiatric genetics.
Communicating Science: Disciplines and Trading Zones
Today, more than ever, science is a complex and corrugated map, partitioned into various 
territories and sub territories (Gieryn 1999). Most commonly, these colonies are identified as 
disciplines (biology, sociology etc.), although others talk of epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina 
1999), or communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991). These divisions are not a mirror 
on the nature they seek to explain; they are not natural kinds that can map exactly to 
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phenomena in the world (Lewis et al. 2016), nor are they pure breeds (Galison 2010). Rather, 
their making takes considerable effort as over time they are landscaped, shaped, and 
accomplished by those inhabiting the space. In this regard, disciplines have both practical and 
symbolic functions.  
Practically, disciplines promote specialisation, provide a home for particular forms of 
techniques and practices, nurture particular ways of thinking and seeing the world (see Fleck 
1935 on thought collectives, or Hacking 1994 on styles of reasoning) and constitute the 
modern social order of academic knowledge (Weingart and Stehr 2000). Symbolically, 
disciplines help to characterise experts as cognisant, providing them with the epistemic 
capital to speak authoritatively over certain matters. But whilst, for example, medics have a 
stake on the understandings of the human brain, so too do biologists, psychologists, 
sociologists, and even artists. To this end, most agree that there is some form of hierarchy of 
esteem in academic scientific disciplines and, ever since a burgeoning science began to 
splinter and fragment, each specialism has gone through its own struggle for recognition 
(Rheinberger 2016).  Physics has often been positioned at the peak of the academic pyramid, 
followed by the other hard sciences of chemistry and biology, and these are separated from 
the softer, human sciences such as psychology, geography and sociology (Storer 1967; Cole 
1983; Pinar et al. 2008), which are themselves considered to be kept apart from the more 
artistic and literary subjects. This is not to say the human sciences or artistic subjects are 
subordinate to the ‘harder’ life sciences, or that they are necessarily less authoritative on 
matters, but that their internal disciplinary integrity is not as strong (Holmwood 2010), their 
methods not as standardised, their shared practice languages not as uniform, and their 
coherence not as secured.1
6 
Each of these scientific collectives also has its own specialised language, its own concepts 
and neologisms - often tacitly understood by its members - and rarely has too much in 
common with other specialisms (see Galison 1997; Collins 2011; Duarte 2013). Disciplinary 
borders therefore have very real effects for those who find themselves inside and outside the 
boundary, for those who walk on the verges, and for those who seek to find ways of 
travelling between the territorial lands. All told, whilst Rheinberger (2016, p. 173) claims that 
the “significance of rigidly fixed disciplines has waned”, the map of science has created 
distinctive affinities that are much more than just surface-level differences in subject matter. 
Significantly, scientists are also socialised into the values of their disciplinary communities, 
the result of which means that the wandering scientist faces a considerable amount of 
reorientation, re-evaluation, and negotiation when she travels across disciplinary borders, 
making the task of doing interstitial work a formidable one (Lewis et al. 2016).  This is what 
Galison and Stump (1996) refer to as the ‘problem of disunity’, and resolving the ways in 
which knowledge and those that produce it can travel between different fields of enquiry, 
despite deep-rooted linguistic (and cultural) differences, has been one of the main focuses of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) (Galison 2010; Reyes-Galindo 2014). 
Nonetheless, nowadays, working between and across disciplines is seen as a good in the 
academy (Strathern 2006). So, how do scientists from apparently incommensurable and 
unconnected epistemes work together? Galison (1997) has provided us with one possible 
conceptual toolkit to understand interdisciplinary and interlinguistic communication. He 
proposes the metaphor of Trading Zones to show how interdisciplinary communication and 
exchange is accomplished within science. The very idea of trading often supposes an 
underlying notion of capital (Galison 2010). Anthropology, though, where work on the 
practices of trade has been assiduously explored, has shown how there is no universal 
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currency of exchange. Groups of people can trade even if they attribute different meanings to 
that which is circulated. And, yet, as Marcel Mauss ([1969, p. 31] 1925) wrote in the early 
20th century, “objects are never completely separated from the [wo]men who exchange them; 
the communion and alliance they establish are well-nigh indissoluble”. For Galison (1997, p. 
783), who uses physics as an example, a similar, and yet different, arrangement is true in 
science.  He points to the way that "two groups can agree on rules of exchange even if they 
ascribe utterly different significance to the objects being exchanged; they may even disagree 
on the meaning of the exchange process itself. Nonetheless, the trading partners can hammer 
out a local coordination, despite vast global differences”. It is therefore in these metaphorical 
Trading zones, according to Galison, where objects are exchanged, ideas are shared, 
interdisciplinary work instigated and interstitial languages formed.  “What is exchange work 
today”, Galison (2010, p. 33) continues, “may well become the disciplinary pillars of 
tomorrow: science is forever in flux, not just in its results but [also] in the contours of its 
disciplines”.  
However, science communication is not solely a matter of scientist-to-scientist interaction 
and exchange. Historically, one of the more impassable borders in the communication of 
science is between science and the non-scientific public who are faced with a torrent of 
technical scientific terms. Indeed, the languages of science are said to be incongruous with 
normal, everyday speak. Despite this, scientists are expected to communicate, and to engage 
with the general public. It is, as Gregory and Miller (1998, p. 1) state, as if “scientists have 
been delivered a new commandment from on high: thou shall communicate” the work of 
science to the masses2. Of course, when we consider science communication, we talk of 
science multiple as we speak of publics plural. When scientists – the travelling disciples 
spreading the scientific word – communicate their work to the public they are presenting 
8 
much more than just their own views and values, and yet they rarely talk for the whole of 
science. They represent, instead, the view of their particular disciplinary specialism or 
collective (see Horst 2013)3.  
In what follows, we consider the particular scientific specialism of psychiatric genetics. As an 
intellectual field, psychiatric genetics is rather promiscuous, appropriating ideas from both 
psychiatry and genetics, as well as other fields of enquiry, in order to try to identify the 
genetic mechanisms underlying susceptibility to common psychiatric conditions such as 
Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder4. We report on a five-year public engagement 
programme that emerged out of The Centre and use it to reflect on the ways in which 
psychiatric genetics engages and encounters different public groups within the topic of 
current developments in mental health (and genetics).  Specifically, we examine several 
public engagement arts events and activities that endeavoured to provide both physical and 
metaphorical space for various publics and experts to come together in conversation about the 
mind and mental health. Such roaming between disciplines like art and science can instigate 
an unsettling, a disturbance that can encourage each disciplinary specialism to look with new 
eyes at their own familiar, and possibly taken for granted perspective. 
Drawing on Galison’s Trading Zone concept for describing interdisciplinary communication, 
we propose the concept of the Buffer Zone: an adaptive space resulting in behavioural 
dispositions that enable conversations about mental health and genetics between experts from 
various disciplinary hinterlands and publics to begin and continue. The Buffer Zone affords 
members from each collective the freedom to broach issues openly; it helps flatten hierarchy, 
resists jargon and protects the discussion of potentially sensitive and threatening topic areas 
from being aborted early because of conversational conflict.  Developing artistic public 
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engagement opportunities within this Buffer Zone framework nurtures the ideal of an 
uninhibited platform for encounters and conversations between people with different 
perspectives on mental health. This encourages an inclusive, dialogical, but questioning 
engagement with developments in psychiatric genetics. Important to STS is to state that to 
buffer is not to de-value expertise (Collins and Evans 2007), but is to recognise the ways in 
which artistic works can illuminate alternative matters of concern (see Holmberg and Ideland 
2016), and allow these matters to be raised and diversify but, most importantly, to be 
conserved. 
The Art of Science; The Science of Art 
Gregory and Miller (1998) remark that 20th century champions of science complained that 
science in popular culture was an underling to other intellectual practices such as literature 
and art. The culture and education of science, and its initial post-war neglect of the public, 
had alienated and distanced many people from the practice (Wynne 1992a). This, they claim, 
was embittered, in part, because the custodians of contemporary culture had been trained in 
subjects other than science. They cite Charles Percy Snow’s 1959 Rede lecture, which 
condemned the UK’s education system for over-valuing literary and artistic skills at the 
expense of scientific pursuits as a defining moment. Snow’s (1959) now (in)famous ‘two 
cultures’ watchword described how he believed fences had been built separating and 
distancing the two terrains from one another to the point that they had almost nothing in 
common (Collins 2014). Few travellers crossed over to the other territory since the two 
cultures were considered impervious to one another. Snow was not the first (nor the last) to 
describe the dichotomous relationship between artistic endeavours and scientific pursuits, but 
his public profile brought the debate to public prominence (Collini 1993).   
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In ‘Two Cultures – And a second look’, Snow (1963) took a more optimistic tone, suggesting 
that a ‘third culture’ would emerge that would bridge the gap between scientists and literary 
scholars. This space – or metaphorical Trading Zone - consisted of so-named ‘social 
historians’, such as sociologists, economists, and historians who were on speaking terms with 
both scientists and artists (see Shaffer 1998). These boundary crawlers could shuttle between 
the cultures, instigating conversations, trading ideas and initiating dialogue.  For the most 
part, though, Snow’s positioning of the sciences and the arts as two poles has been criticised 
to the point that this dichotomous relationship has now become somewhat of a trope.5 Hall 
(1999) discusses how framing knowledge production in binary terms, such as between 
science and art, can simply serve to entrap us. This entrapment undermines the need to focus 
on a more general and powerful willingness to question any claims to knowledge irrespective 
of their disciplinary roots.  
Notwithstanding the criticism of the ‘two cultures’ allegory, much work is still required if 
one wishes to bridge scientific and artistic worlds. Some of the tensions between art and 
science arise from differences in, what Collins and Evans (2007) describe as, their formative 
intention in relation to interpretative ambiguity: unlike many contemporary artists, scientists 
do not explicitly intend to produce ambiguous communications from their discipline. Indeed, 
many scientists advocate scientific clarity and regard science as a route to some underlying 
truth through a systematic, analytical approach (Popper 1994)6. This scientific attitude often 
extends into how science should be communicated. Societal scientific literacy can be 
achieved, so the deficit model tells us, if leading scientists recite top-down accounts about 
truths, facts and statistics clearly and authoritatively to an uneducated and ignorant public 
(The Royal Society 1985, see also Wilsdon and Willis (2004) for criticisms of PUS’ failings 
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on Genetically Modified crops and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy)7. Artists, on the 
other hand, are not necessarily interested in truth and rational objectivity. They are concerned 
with exploring and expressing the various ways in which we experience the world, 
interrupting, reframing and creatively seeking alternatives (see Baker and Gigliotti 2006), 
with many artists actively encouraging multiple interpretations of their work (Weintraub 
2003). Ede (2005, p. 42) synthesizes this difference between art and science: 
Compared with the cool rationalism of science with its material belief in wholeness, the theories 
employed by thinkers in the arts and humanities seem part of a playful circular game in which the 
truth is never to be privileged in one direction or another and is always out of reach. 
There should be no getting away from the fact that a scientific attitude and an artistic 
imagination, with its playful, often metaphorical and abstract ways of thinking and 
communicating, can be very different. This does not mean, however, that they are completely 
incongruous. As Bright (2000, p. 140) contends within the context of contemporary art 
practice: “the quest for simplicity on the part of science and the delight in complexity on the 
part of art are incompatible although each side can learn from the other”. Indeed, art may be 
more successful at engaging with science because of the expectation for art to be playful, 
challenging and subversive in a way that opens up opportunities for discussion (Calvert and 
Schyfter 2016). Wilson (2010) even argues that art and science can no longer survive in 
isolation from one another, either in terms of public support or in the production of 
knowledge. Whilst art - like science - takes many forms and has many processes, 
fundamentally it is a way of thinking and making connections, a way of communicating and a 
way of challenging. When freedom of expression is used as a political tool, art and artists 
have “come to occupy a privileged and enduring place in society […] mobilising ideas and 
people to support or usurp powerful actors and systems” (Phillips 2008, p. 75). As practice, 
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art - again, in a similar vein to science - can offer answers and pose new questions about how 
we experience and understand both the world around us and ourselves. 
For evidence of their mutual interests, one needs only to examine the emergence of 
collaborative art and science initiatives since the 1990s as common ground whereby the two 
cultures have come (and worked) together8. Creative forms of public engagement with 
science operate within what Kinchy and Kleinman (2003) describe as the tension between the 
routine, conforming, and deep-rooted disciplinary desire for scientific purity and the pressure 
to demonstrate social relevance and utility. Science – the dialogical approach to 
communication tells us - is not done in a vacuum, it is part of society and scientists need to be 
open to and respond to the multiple perspectives and various ways in which developments in 
science are interpreted, accepted, and appropriated (see Irwin and Wynne 1996; Miller 2001; 
Horlick-Jones et al. 2007). Simply put, publics are not empty vessels ripe for filling. They 
already have existing beliefs, attitudes, alliances and ways of knowing.  The colonisation 
therefore of this different type of ‘third culture’ by artists working with scientists to engage 
with scientific ideas and interests, once seen to be the domain of just scientists, is now 
commonplace (see Webster 2005). Through opening up the scientific process to artists, there 
is the opportunity to re-frame, reflect, re-imagine and re-purpose science. This creative 
wandering can also capture a perspective, or way of thinking, that has been forgotten, 
overlooked or pushed aside by science: a viewpoint other than that which surfaces solely 
from the laboratory.
Translating Psychiatric Genetics: From Bench to Brain 
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Over the past 25 years, UK science communication initiatives and public engagement with 
science and technology programmes have profited from the close relationship that art and 
artists have with different publics and communities. Formal support and funding, as well as 
more grass-roots encounters persist throughout the UK. The Wellcome Trust, a major British 
biosciences funding body, for example, continues to fund such collaborative endeavours, 
while 2017 sees the opening of Science Gallery London, part of a global initiative that 
promises to connect the arts, science and health to “inspire the next generation of creative 
thinkers” (Science Gallery 2016). This alliance though is more problematic when the science 
in question is psychiatric genetics. Though there is a long trail of work in the area of ‘art and 
mental health’, this often comes under the guise of art therapy or the promotion of health and 
wellbeing through creativity (Schmid 2005). There is much less work fostering an open 
dialogue about aspects of the diagnosis, causation and treatment of psychiatric conditions 
with public groups. Expressed frankly, psychiatric genetics has had a troubled relationship 
with the public (Smith 2008). Furthermore, the contested nature of psychiatry (Foucault 
1986; Conrad and Barker 2010; Hacking 2000), the historical controversies within genetics 
(Kerr and Shakespeare 2002), and bad media experiences (Dreaper 2010) have added to 
scientific researchers’ concerns that involvement with the arts might consolidate and 
perpetuate the perception that psychiatric genetics is a less scientific area of medicine. 
Nonetheless, psychiatric genetics research critically depends on an increased awareness and 
support of its research in order to attract funding and to raise its status as a discipline. Publics 
such as patients and research study controls are also resources necessary to do big population 
studies like psychiatric genetics research (Lewis and Bartlett 2015). 
It is important to stress here that the history and politics of the specialisms of psychiatry and 
genetics has produced a very different landscape of opportunities and risk in public 
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engagement imagined by psychiatric geneticists than that anticipated by, say, theoretical 
physicists. Engaging publics with the topic of mental health clearly involves a great deal 
more than simply communicating concepts clearly and effectively. Like much work on 
science communication proposes, it is also about framing, trust and epistemic hierarchy 
(Jasanoff 2003; Nisbet 2009). Of particular concern to psychiatric genetics is that public 
engagement with mental health requires an astute awareness of the complex power dynamics 
between experts and publics because of the inherent emotional resonance and contested 
nature of the subject matter. Advice arising from the public engagement of other emotive, and 
sometimes hostile, socio-scientific issues related to human behaviours, such as climate 
change, is to recommend that scientists do not avoid engaging with the public but that they 
should be aware that regaling facts is not enough, and that deeper human traits and feelings 
contribute to the subjective lens through which information is processed (Revkin 2011; 
Roeser 2012). Other social attitudes relevant to the communication of mental health research 
includes aspects often captured by the term stigma and, against this background, psychiatric 
geneticists feel that public engagement is a way to tackle not only stigma attached to mental 
illness, but also stigma attached to biological psychiatry itself (Lewis and Bartlett 2015). 
These issues of expertise, trust, power, diagnostic contestation, and stigma contribute to the 
tensions that can arise during the communication of psychiatric genetics research. 
In order to explore the ways in which art can buffer potential clashes between psychiatric 
geneticists and publics, we endeavoured to engage with a wide spectrum of public groups. 
Embarking on our public engagement arts project, we were originally told not to ‘scare the 
horses’ and ‘not in front of the children’ by psychiatric geneticists at The Centre acutely 
aware of these complex dynamics and the ways in which their field is perceived. In 2011, 
despite some dissenting voices, we began to collaborate as social scientist and artist. Lines of 
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enquiry within the artworks included laboratory practice, metaphors of genetics, gene-
environment interaction, the collaborative nature of large-scale genomic research, and the 
hopes and expectations of psychiatric genetics research. Some of the artworks, for instance, 
centred on aspects of ‘big biology’ (Bartlett 2008; Hilgartner 2013), which in the case of 
psychiatric genetics, is characterised by the necessarily large-scale collaborative patient 
studies that examine DNA from blood samples in relation to information provided in patient 
surveys. Large scale painting ‘Big Science I’, art installation ‘Big Science II’ and interactive 
digital artwork ‘Disturbing the Blueprint’ all incorporated elements that invited the public to 
participate, interact, and contribute either through the making of small components of the 
artwork or through direct bodily interaction, for example, by making a sound into a 
microphone that disturbed an edited image of themselves. A playful and seemingly trivial but 
surprisingly successful participatory act was the making and contribution of small blood red 
wire figures, used as the starting point for the painting ‘Big Science I’ and incorporated into 
the installation ‘Big Science II’. Over 200 people contributed wire figures and this 
participation stimulated conversations about the scientific content of the artworks. 
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Big Science I, Big Science II and Disturbing the Blueprint 
Although these were primarily object-based artworks, they fulfilled the function of what 
Kester (2004) refers to as ‘conversation pieces’. Whilst one perspective is that these artworks 
served as icebreakers9, encouraging participation and discussion between the artistic work, 
the viewer and the subject matter; another perspective from socially engaged art practice is 
that the conversation and social engagement itself becomes the work of art (Helguera 2011). 
Careful consideration of the level of public participation is important to enable meaningful 
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experiences and communication between individuals, and also to encourage publics to 
contribute and not to simply stand back as passive recipients. As Thomas (2012, p. 19) states: 
“recognising the importance of the public voice is vital for the public engagement of science 
but creating the right space for the public to feel they can contribute to the conversation can 
be a challenge”. The motivation for this trialogue (see Anderson et al. 201010) – the expert, 
the public and the artwork – arises from observing that people are much more likely to 
instigate a conversation or participate in a discussion whilst in the role of creative participant, 
actively doing, rather than passively observing.   
Other artists were invited to contribute to the growing conversation and the work took on a 
curatorial aspect, seeking out new perspectives and connections but always with the focus on 
public dialogue. We developed and organised two public engagement exhibitions called 
Translation: From Bench to Brain in 2011 and How The Light Gets In in 2013 that moved 
developments in psychiatric genetics and mental health out of the laboratory and into the 
public arena. These two exhibitions alone attracted around 1000 attendees. Academic 
speakers at public talks held within the exhibition spaces were impressed at how engaged and 
eager those that attended were to ask questions. Combining these well-attended academic 
presentations with smaller discussion sessions, creative workshops, music events, and poetry 
sittings, the gallery drew in particular publics who, we noticed, were comfortable with 
traditional art gallery spaces. Experimenting with different places and spaces of dialogue to 
attract new publics, the work expanded into empty shops in the centre of town, domestic 
spaces, a church, online interactions, and a yearlong series of art residencies, exhibitions and 
events in a large disused attic of a mental health charity.  
Throughout these encounters between various lay public groups, scientists, medical students, 
18 
social scientists and artists, we constantly sought new, creative and pan-disciplinary ways to 
both communicate and connect the varied understandings of the mind. Art and its use of 
metaphor, we maintain, provide the opportunity to re-imagine and interrupt the boundaries 
and relationships between different (disciplinary) cultures and sources of knowledge and to 
break away from the familiar and the rehearsed. We now turn to a discussion on metaphor, 
before discussing our concept of the Buffer Zone. 
The Role and Rule of Metaphor in Science, Art and Communication 
The word ‘metaphor’ originates from the Greek word metaphora, meaning ‘a transfer’ (OED 
1989). Classically, it has been widespread in the artistic specialisms, especially within writing 
and poetry, the interchangeable play on words regarded as a form of ornamental language 
removed from the everyday. An extension to understanding metaphor as a transfer is that of a 
puzzling but calculated borrowing. In this sense, two seemingly different concepts interact 
such that one disturbs the other and it is this disruption that results in the generation of new 
perceptions, knowledge, and meaning (Black 1962; Ricoeur 2008).  Of relevance to this idea 
of disruption is the work of critical thinker Serres (1982), regarded as a traveller between the 
arts and the sciences. His thoughts on science communication are particularly interesting in 
this respect since he described three elements: (i) a message, (ii) a channel for transmitting 
the message, and (iii) the noise or interference that accompanies the transmission. The noise 
may make the reading of the message more difficult but the metaphor, regarded as noise, 
creates a tension that “calls for decipherment [...] that opens up such a fertile avenue of 
reflection” (Lechte 2008, p. 348).  
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Metaphor is therefore a borrowing, a deviation, a transposition and a perplexity (Ricoeur 
2008), but this is no longer considered to be merely linguistic decoration. Rather, it is a 
ubiquitous way of thinking and reasoning, a cognitive device for our creation of meaning and 
understanding (Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 2003). By a process of surprise and 
disruption, it allows us to transcend literal thinking and begin to generate meaning through 
questioning the connections that have been made in the process of developing the metaphor. 
This questioning then instigates a shift within the process of how we understand concepts by 
relating them to our own experiences (Lakoff and Johnson 2003). 
Science, of course, is not averse to using metaphor both within its ways of working and in 
how it is communicated.11 Brown (2003, p. 2), for example, has argued that, “much of what 
scientists do [...] is governed by metaphorical reasoning”. He maintains that metaphor links 
the language of science to the underlying reality it strives to achieve. According to Ahmad 
(2006, p. 198): “scientists literally and metaphorically create a world of make-believe through 
a web of words – some borrowed, some invented, endorsing self-belief here and suppressing 
the beliefs of others there”. Metaphors delivered to a wider public often do this by drawing 
on objects that are familiar in society (Hellsten 2008). An often-used example of the use of 
metaphors to make sense of and to communicate complex science is evident in the field of 
genetics (Keller 1995; Kay 2000; Wolfe 2001; Condit 2009; O’Riordan 2010) where phrases 
such as the genetic code, the gene machine, gene mapping, blueprints and the book of life are 
frequently used. Similarly, metaphors can be used to communicate genetic risk and 
susceptibility, as described to us by a leading psychiatric geneticist working at The Centre. 
So, you know, you may have a number of risk factors, and then if you develop a certain 
amount of risk, you will tip the scales. So, you would say you are trying to get this idea of 
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balance and an accumulation of risk actually getting you into the diseased state. I would use 
visual clues to help me do that, but most people understand it. 
[Interview with Professor of Psychiatric Genetics] 
Linking to everyday societal objects such as weighing scales enables metaphors to be more 
persuasive when scientists communicate their ideas of genetic susceptibility to the public, 
bridging scientific and popular discourse. Likewise, the artist, through the use of metaphor, of 
making connections and seeing the similar in the dissimilar to suggest and evoke rather than 
to state facts, may help publics find a way into discussing the science by inviting, rather than 
eradicating, uncertainty. Thomas’s interactive computer artwork, ‘Disturbing the Blueprint’, 
on show in the exhibitions was a commentary on the use of metaphors within the history of 
genetics, and how those metaphors have been used to bridge temporary gaps in knowledge. 
Likening computer-programming code to the metaphor of the genetic ‘code’, the work also 
highlighted how the language and discourse of genetics was influenced in the 1950s by the 
growth in computing and information theory. Visitors to the art-spaces were invited to have 
their photograph taken to add to the growing collection of images within ‘Disturbing the 
Blueprint’. We explained how computer code enabled noise from the surrounding 
environment, picked up by the microphone, to disrupt and discolour blue and white versions 
of the contributed images. Following this, visitors were invited to disturb their own image 
and those of others. This participatory process initiated a conversation about the historical 
developments in the originally proposed concept of a genetic blueprint and how our 
understanding of this is constantly evolving.
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Disturbing the Blueprint 
‘Big Science I’ and ‘Big Science II’ invited various publics to consider the unique 
contributions of individuals to genetic studies of psychiatric conditions and the collective 
efforts required to accomplish big population studies. These and other related artworks by 
Thomas evoked parallels between changes in creative media and developments in scientific 
technology that enabled reflections on the relationship between science and publics, and the 
timescale over which the generation of scientific knowledge takes place. By working with 
and experiencing these different media, public participants began to question, develop, and 
contribute meaning about the broader scientific references made within the artworks. In this 
participatory format, visual culture, and art and metaphor can provide a framework that 
encourages different groups to feel like they can contribute to the discourse of science, 
specifically because of the ambiguous nature of metaphors compared to standard forms of 
communication. Science, for example, is said to resist ambiguity and utilise very technical 
terminology when transferring and translating knowledge. Contemporary art, on the other 
hand, often invokes a purposeful elusiveness, employing tactics such as symbolism and 
metaphor (Hausman 1989; Collins and Evans 2007) in order to invite a response.  
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From reflecting upon this case study, we suggest that propositions about future scenarios, 
ethical concerns, queries that go beyond current knowledge and questions aiming to reveal 
what might currently be concealed are given leverage by the ambiguity of metaphor. 
Ambiguity, although often the adversary to scientific clarity, provides an opportunity for far-
reaching questions and statements to not be considered out of place. However, enabling 
space, both physical and communicative, for boundaries to be transgressed can be a 
tempestuous negotiation that we argue art and metaphor has the potential to buffer. 
Buffer Zones between Experts and Publics
Galison’s Trading Zones concept is a metaphor taken from the economic transaction of 
goods between people from different cultures and applied to the sciences to describe a 
space where interdisciplinary research is instigated. Similar to a marketplace, a trading 
zone is a place where merchants from various hinterlands, speaking different languages, 
come together to form alliances, hammer out deals and exchange goods.  
A Buffer Zone, on the other hand, is an area of land that lies between two (or more) hostile 
regions. They are often neutral zones, sometimes designed for environmental purposes and 
help to mitigate conflict between regions by keeping them apart or or by uniting them. The 
word buffer also has several connotations. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED 1989), to buffer has at least three actions specific to (i) everyday use, (ii) to 
chemistry and (iii) to computing.  
verb: buffer 
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 to lesson or moderate the impact of something or form a barrier between incompatible 
or antagonistic people or things 
 to treat with a solution which resists changes in pH when acid or alkali is added to it 
 to store (data) in a temporary memory area while it is being processed or transferred 
(OED 1989) 
In modern talk, ‘to buffer’ is used in both computing and railway parlance. It often refers 
to the display of pre-loaded content to alleviate an interrupted video streaming on the web, 
allowing the user to continue viewing. It is also used in reference to the buffer-and-chain 
coupling system on the railway networks. Attached to the end of carriages with shock 
absorbing pads, trains and wagons are brought safely into contact with one another via this 
arrangement. Finally, in the same workplace, the term describes a barrier, preventing trains 
running off track.  
Each of these meanings could easily be used to describe the various ways in which artworks 
have agency within the public engagement of psychiatric genetics. Conversations between 
psychiatric geneticists and publics can travel in non-linear and divergent directions, moving 
from topic to topic, from matter of concern to matter of concern, attempting to escape, 
running out of steam and sometimes de-railing. This requires some repair work, but too much 
meddling and managing and those that attend may wish to use an alternative platform to 
express their views or, worse still, retreat back to their original stations. Here, when we talk 
about the Buffer Zone in relation to our art initiatives, we are not solely talking about the 
physical space that the artworks inhabit but also the less tangible space in which conversation 
turns to matters of concern, and the point at which the conversation begins to break down. 
Figures 1 to 6 show how we have developed the concept of the Buffer Zone beginning with 
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‘head-on’ forms of science communication through to the various features of public 
engagement within either a typical art-space such as a gallery or less mainstream spaces in 
which artworks take place, both designated by the term (art)space.  
Public engagement with science is “an often messy and contradictory business where 
dilemmas and paradoxes abound” (Irwin 2014, p. 74). For example, publics can come into 
conflict with scientific experts on issues such as agricultural biotechnology, nanotechnology
or fracking. Issues of authority and power, as well as differences in outlooks, expertise and 
life experiences can lead to clashes between different groups and collectives during these 
more head-on forms of science communication and interactions.12 Figure 1 represents a 
scenario typical of many public ‘dialogue’ events whereby the scientific experts are 
positioned and privileged in a way that can create a sense of opposition with those attending 
the event, such as in a panel talk or a formal presentation.  
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Interactional and behavioural norms of when and how a public ‘audience’ is allowed to 
contribute means that agency is privileged to the invited speakers and conflict emerges 
from the attendees’ struggle to be heard (Davies 2011). Occasionally, this manifests itself 
as the ignoring of the ceremonial order of turn-taking and other public event etiquettes, 
signifying a rejection of this kind of format and its inherent power structures. Therefore, 
aside from clashes arising because of the subject matter of psychiatric genetics, there are 
generic factors related to the format of an event that can induce skirmishes. 
Attention can be directed away from the confrontational nature of these head-on forms of 
science communication through artworks that can open up opportunities for reflection and 
conversation (see Figure 2). This is not to avoid challenges, but is to mitigate unnecessary 
confrontation. Whilst a lack of open conflict at public engagement events has been 
interpreted by some as a submissive but complicit alliance, resulting in friendly 
unchallenging interactions (Kerr et al. 2007), this does not mean that conflict is always 
necessary for meaningful and effective dialogue. 
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As we have found when using artworks to foster dialogue at various public engagement 
events, the metaphorical references often prompted people to begin a process of questioning, 
firstly to make meaning of the artwork, and subsequently the science. In the act of making, 
contributing and experiencing artworks, metaphor offers alternative imaginings in order to
understand one experience in terms of another, what Lakoff and Johnson (2003) refer to as 
imaginative rationality. Different artworks within a public exhibition will inevitably instigate 
various degrees of reflection and conversation depending on a combination of the artistic 
agency and metaphorical content, the scientific content, aspects of presentation, and person-
specific sensibilities of the viewer. The amount of imaginative and reflective content will 
vary according to the interplay between the trialogue of artwork, scientific content and 
participatory onlooker (see Figure 3).  
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The scientific content related to an artwork may be embedded within the piece or it may 
surround it such as in information panels or accompanying academic talks. As depicted in 
Figure 4, engagement can be augmented via artist-led or curator-led talks and this we found 
facilitated conversations whereby the mixed audiences, including public groups, scientists, 
social scientists and so on, were able to respond to the artworks through the lens of their own 
experiences and expertise.
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Walking and talking resonates with the idea of walking as a qualitative social research tool
and means to knowledge whereby “it produces not a conventional interrogative encounter, 
but a collage of collaboration” (Anderson 2004, p. 260). Rather than walking through place, 
our ‘walk and talk’ through the (art)space was a wandering through the scientific disciplines, 
themes and issues relevant to psychiatric genetics. This journey and its talk is not always a 
friendly amble. However, potential pitfalls and potholes can be negotiated within the Buffer 
Zone (see Figure 5).
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Although the architecture and physical limits of the (art)space can serve the purpose of a 
tangible observable boundary, the Buffer Zone and its limits also refer to the less tangible 
conversational and imaginative spaces that we occupy. Rather than viewing our arts activities 
as simply science communication then, in our public engagement programme we sought to 
explore how different perspectives and voices could come together within a framework that is 
at least one step removed from science, unafraid of controversy and multiple interpretations, 
familiar with evoking emotion, and embedded within ethical enquiry – in other words, art. 
We continued to examine the ways in which the complexity, troubles, hopes and fears within 
and surrounding psychiatric genetics might be aired in a less confrontational and more 
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constructive way, aiming to keep people in the conversation, not losing them at the first clash 
or quarrel. We found that this dialogic and questioning standpoint, facilitated through the use 
of art and metaphor, afforded new framings in which public groups might feel they could 
engage with psychiatric genetics. This approach empowered people to air their fears such as 
to question how the translation of current research into therapeutic tools might ‘alter’ people 
with mental illness and how that vision for the future affects the way in which society 
perceives those people in the present. The idea of a modern-day eugenics remains a 
considerable concern to some people who feel that others are in control of their lives, while 
the perception of a knowledge-seeking but emotionless scientific approach was also raised as 
a concern. To this end, we found that people were not so interested in the science itself, much 
of it perceived as mundane lab-work and computer work. Instead, publics, and especially 
those with mental illness, were interested in what the science can do, and what impact it will 
have on people’s lives. They were interested in the use of the science, its value and how it 
might be appropriated. 
Discussion 
The public engagement of psychiatric genetics and genomics is no easy task. Psychiatry’s 
problematic past and genetics’ as yet unfulfilled promises for a therapeutic future means there 
is the potential for conflict during public engagement events. These tensions can further 
inflame the usual considerations related to issues of trust, power dynamics and disciplinary 
boundaries of any science communication initiative. As foregrounded earlier, Mauss’ 
observations of many decades previous, that exchange is intimately tied to those involved, 
highlights that discussions between psychiatric geneticists and publics involve much more 
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than just the delivery of words, more than just sentiment too, what is said comes with the 
burden of unfinished business. This history (personal, professional and disciplinary) may 
originate from social factors related to perceived disparities in expertise and authority, but 
also past encounters between individuals and mental health professionals and researchers. 
Such unresolved concerns and transactions can be the root of any conflict and get in the way 
of what is said. 
While, of course, the communication of developments in psychiatric genetics to publics 
should be much more than conveying information, facts and opinions clearly, the context for 
this is likely to be very different to interdisciplinary communication between specialisms and 
also very likely differs from the way other scientific specialisms communicate with their 
publics. That said, there are some parallels here between the public engagement of 
psychiatric genetics and other emotive socio-scientific subject matters that are dependent on 
human behaviour such as climate change. In examples such as these, there is a danger of 
swinging between the extremes of polite, unchallenging, almost subjugated discussion and 
dialogically destructive altercations. 
We have therefore proposed that contemporary art within an adaptive and participatory public 
engagement programme provides a framework within which conflict can be mitigated so that 
constructive and meaningful dialogue takes place. Art can provide a framework that is 
comfortable with multiple interpretations and unafraid of controversy, provoking a 
willingness to challenge and question each other’s perspectives and claims to knowledge 
irrespective of disciplinary roots and levels of expertise. In particular, we have extended 
Galison’s concept of the Trading Zone to consider how an exchange of viewpoints can be 
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facilitated through the use of art and metaphor. A conceptual, cognitive view of metaphor 
provides a useful mechanism to promote thinking about one thing in terms of another, to 
disturb the familiar and taken for granted ways of thinking, and to provoke a questioning 
mentality. 
Bringing art and science together as part of a science communication initiative provided the 
opportunity to mollify conflict. Crucial to stress is that this mitigation was not to protect the 
science; it was to protect the conversation. By reflecting on five years of artistic public 
engagement activities using art and metaphor, both within mainstream and less traditional 
(art)spaces, we have developed the concept of the Buffer Zone. The artwork and associated 
metaphors enable conversations between scientists and publics to begin and to be maintained. 
It absorbs the head-on collision of aggressive questioning and enables just enough space so 
that potential conflict is ameliorated sufficiently to bring the conversation back to one that is 
constructive. If Galison (1997, 2010) uses the concept of Trading Zones to describe a place 
where scientific cultures and epistemes come together to forge alliances, Buffer Zones are 
spaces that recognise the differences in power between two (or more) cultural groups (see 
also Collins et al. 2010). It is a term that recognises the differences in the understanding of 
and relationship with the subject matter at hand and the importance that conversations do take 
place between groups that are often uneasy and unsteady in one another’s company, enabling 
all the various positions to be heard, and not losing people at the first hint, or immanent fear, 
of discord.  
Those involved in psychiatric genetics research might feel that engaging with these ‘social’ 
issues is to step out of their ‘comfort zone’, less a foot into a foreign land and more a jump 
from solid ground into wide, open oceans. Important to stress is that the concept of the Buffer 
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Zone carries out work in both directions. It helps keep publics in the conversation, but also 
sanctions scientists to work with other disciplines to confront some of the social and ethical 
concerns and not to shy away from, to use another metaphorical warning from The Centre, 
‘airing their dirty linen in public’. 
To conclude, we have reflected on how the scientific specialism of psychiatric genetics can 
re-connect with society through artistic work. Based on our wide range of experiences and 
observations within the public engagement of psychiatric genetics, our concept of the Buffer 
Zone proposes a way of working with unpredictable and divergent forms of intercultural 
communication within controversial and emotive science. The Buffer Zone protects the 
discussion of potentially sensitive and threatening topic areas from being aborted due to 
conflict, enabling groups to negotiate perceived battlegrounds rather than erecting old and 
new barricades.  
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(Ede 2005) or inauthentic (Glinkowski and Bamford 2009) precisely because circumstances have meant the 
artists were seen to be simply illustrating science and not engaging in real and meaningful dialogue with 
scientists.
48 
9 Perceived like this, the artwork could also be described as a boundary object (Star and Griesemer 1989).
10 Anderson (2010) uses the concept of the trialogue in the context of walking and talking methods and, in 
particular, the relationship between the researcher, the participant and the place where they are walking.
11 Nowadays, the language of contemporary science is said to be under stress with words being used to 
characterise processes that on the surface appear indescribable (Hoffman 2002).
12 See Wynne (1992b), Yearley (2005), and Wilsdon and Willis (2004) for examples of clashes between 
scientific experts and publics related to radioactive fallout in Cumbria, North England, the BSE crisis, 
genetically modified crops, and the Mumps Measles Rubella (MMR) vaccine.
